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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

According to recent figures released by The Innocence Project, there have
been 292 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States alone. Of these 292
exonerations, 72%, or 210 involved eyewitness misidentification testimony
(www.theinnocenceproject.org). This confirms the fact that mistaken eyewitness
identifications are a significant source of wrongful convictions. There are currently
two possible ways to address the issues of wrongful convictions caused by mistaken
eyewitness identifications. The first is developing procedures that minimize the
likelihood of a mistaken identification. This has been evident since the work of the
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence (1999) that stipulated methods
collect identifications that help reduce the likelihood of obtaining a mistaken
identification. Most of the work on eyewitness memory has been focused on these
procedural changes. The second way to address this issue is to investigate alternative
ways of postdicting the accuracy of an eyewitness’s identification. Postdictors are
variables that can be measured which help determine accurate from inaccurate
eyewitnesses after their identification has been made. The aim of the current paper is
to introduce a novel form of postdicting eyewitness identification accuracy across two
mediums of identification tasks – lineups and showups.
In a typical eyewitness identification situation, an eyewitness will view a
crime, authorities will apprehend a suspect, and ask the eyewitness to make an
1

identification. There are two ways in which this identification can occur. The first
identification is called a lineup. A lineup is typically an array of six or more people,
that can be presented live or photographic, and generally includes 6 to 8 people
including the suspect. The second form of identification is called a showup. Showup
procedures occur when one suspect is shown to the eyewitness. Typically showups
are live presentations and are conducted in close temporal proximity to the crime. A
target present lineup occurs when the perpetrator is in the identification procedure. If
the perpetrator is not in the lineup it is referred to as a target absent procedure
(Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Cling, 2012). It is difficult to determine with any degree of
certainty whether or not a perpetrator is present in either of these identification tasks,
making eyewitness accounts a key step in the judicial procedure.
There are different outcomes that can occur when eyewitnesses are asked to
make an identification. A correct identification occurs when an eyewitness correctly
identifies the perpetrator. A correct rejection is a situation in which an eyewitness
says the perpetrator is not there when in fact the perpetrator is not in the lineup or
showup (i.e., when it is a target absent identification task). A filler identification
occurs when an eyewitness makes an identification of a known innocent person from
a lineup. A miss occurs when an eyewitness fails to choose the perpetrator from a
target present lineup. Finally a false identification occurs whenever an eyewitness
chooses an innocent suspect. To clarify, an innocent suspect is a person placed in an
identification procedure who the authorities believe is the perpetrator of a crime, but
in fact did not commit the crime (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003). It must
be made clear that filler identifications are not dangerous because these are
individuals who are known to be innocent. False identifications are the most
dangerous because in these situations innocent suspects can be detained and charged
2

for a crime they did not commit. It is the aim of most eyewitness identification
research to reduce the probability of innocent suspect identifications (TWGEE, 1999).
Current Postdictors of Identification Accuracy
The main goal of postdictors is to allow those on the jury to determine the
accuracy of an eyewitness’ identification. There are multiple measures that have been
used to postdict identification accuracy, but three of the most commonly discussed are
confidence, decision time, and decision making strategy. While all three have some
ability to differentiate accurate from inaccurate witnesses, they all have limitations.
For this reason it is important to seek out other methods for determining eyewitness
accuracy.
Eyewitness certainty is the most researched postdictor of eyewitness
identification accuracy. Eyewitness certainty (or confidence) is the most influential
factor in how persuasive jurors find eyewitness identifications (Cutler, Penrod &
Dexter, 1990). Eyewitnesses who are more confident in their identification are seen as
more credible, and jurors are more likely to ignore inconsistencies in an eyewitness’
account if they are more confident (Brewer & Burke, 2002). This means that
independent of their accuracy, eyewitnesses who are more confident in their
identification increase the likelihood that jurors believe their testimony.
It is important to determine the degree confidence and accuracy are related
because of the ways that confidence affects a jury’s perceptions of eyewitnesses.
Sporer, Penrod, Read and Cutler (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of 30 lab-based
studies that examined the confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship and found an overall
average correlation of .29; a relatively low correlation. When they analyzed only the
participants who made an identification (i.e., choosers), the confidence accuracy
3

correlation actually increased to .40. It must be noted that the conditions
eyewitnesses are under vary greatly from those in the laboratory. In fact, for those
participants in the lab, the opportunity to view the criminal is often optimal. That is,
participants are asked to make an identification shortly after viewing the crime, they
get a good view of the perpetrator’s face, and there is little to no stress. Thus in the
laboratory researchers are probably overestimating the CA correlation.
Considering that confidence and accuracy are only moderately related,
researchers have attempted to use calibration measures as an alternative measurement
(Brewer, Keast, Rishworth, 2002; Brewer & Wells, 2006). The calibration of the
relationship between confidence and accuracy is essentially the probability that a
person is accurate at a particular level of confidence. For instance, if an individual has
perfect calibration, they would report 70% certainty and be correct 7 of 10 times.
Using this method of measurement, researchers have determined that witnesses who
are more confident also tend to be more accurate. This calibration method is not
perfect. One of the criticisms of this is that at lower and higher ranges of confidence,
participants seem to be under- or over-confident, respectively (Lampinen, Neuschatz,
and Cling, 2012). For instance, if participants indicate that they are 95% confident,
they are often only accurate around 80% of the time.
There have also been other factors that have since been found that influence
how well confidence and accuracy are calibrated. Brewer et al. (2002), for example,
used two manipulations, reflection and disconfirmation, in an attempt to improve
eyewitness calibration. Reflection consisted of asking participants a series of
questions about their experience at the time of witnessing the event and at the lineup.
Disconfirmation asked participants to indicate reasons as to why they would have
chosen the wrong person from the lineup identification. A control condition was
4

offered in which no instructional manipulation was given to participants. Brewer et al.
found that in the control condition where participants only completed a distracter task
and were not given any instructions, calibration was poor, but for both reflection and
disconfirmation, this manipulation improved the calibration of eyewitnesses.
Similarly to the previous criticisms of calibration, it was found that when analyzing
higher levels of confidence, participants seemed to be over-confident in their decision
making and at lower levels of confidence, participants were under-confident. This
over/under confidence influenced the reported measures of calibration even when
manipulations were in place.
Decision Time and Decision Making Strategy.
In order to understand decision time and decision making strategy, it is
important to understand the underlying cognitive theories of eyewitness identification.
The main focus of these postdictors deals with the strategy employed by an
eyewitness when choosing a suspect from a lineup. Wells (1984) distinguished
between absolute and relative judgment strategies. Wells argued that an absolute
judgment strategy occurs when witnesses reach their decision by comparing the image
of the suspect with their memory of the perpetrator. Relative judgments occur when
the eyewitness eliminates all members of the lineup until the options are narrowed to
a best match. It has been widely held that eyewitnesses who perform an absolute
judgment strategy are more accurate than are those who make relative judgments
(Caputo & Dunning, 2007).
In regards to decision time, it has been found that participants who are
quickest to make identifications from a lineup are significantly more likely to be
correct than are those who take a longer time to make identification (Smith, Lindsay,
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& Pryke, 2000). This may indicate that participants who make a decision at a faster
speed are actually performing an absolute judgment strategy. Although this may be
true, it is unclear as to what amount of time signifies a “quick” decision, and one that
is a “slow” decision. Research conducted by Dunning and Perretta (2002) used a time
boundary analysis from four separate studies to determine a functional range at which
eyewitnesses could be categorized as accurate. This analysis revealed that an interval
of 10-12 s could be used as a temporal boundary for judging eyewitness accuracy.
That is, those eyewitnesses who made an identification around this 10-12 s mark were
more accurate than were those who took longer. Although this rule of thumb would be
of practical use for real world situations, the finding has not been supported across a
wide range of stimuli and populations.
The 10-12 s mark initially described by Dunning and Perretta has since come
under scrutiny. Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, and Keast (2004) tested the 10-12 s
rule to determine its usefulness in a real world setting. To do this, Weber et al. tested
the 10-12 s rule across multiple variables, including age of participants, lineup format,
target stimuli, and different event stimuli. Overall the results revealed that the 10-12 s
rule was not applicable across all of these situations, viewing events, and stimuli, and
may not be a plausible real world standard. Similar findings by Brewer, Caon, Todd,
and Weber (2006) revealed the 10-12 s rule produced different results in different
conditions and that the time boundary that best discriminates accurate from inaccurate
eyewitness identifications is not consistent. It seems then that faster decisions by
eyewitnesses do frequently indicate a more accurate eyewitness, but the temporal
boundary to be used to determine an accurate eyewitness from an inaccurate one may
vary across conditions and situations.
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The last postdictor of eyewitness identification accuracy is witnesses’ selfreported decision strategy. Dunning and Stern (1994) tested whether participants’
self-reported strategies could actually be employed to determine eyewitness accuracy.
To do this, they had participants view a videotaped staged crime in which a man steals
money out of a woman’s purse. After viewing the video, participants were asked to
make an identification from a target present lineup and they were asked how they
arrived at their choice from the lineup. For example, participants were given
statements similar to “I just recognized him, I can’t explain why”, and “His face just
‘popped’ out at me”. Other statements, such as, “I first eliminated the ones definitely
not him, then chose among the rest” and “He was the closest person to what I
remember, but not exact” were offered as well. Across four separate experiments
participants who chose the statements of “I just recognized him, I can’t explain why”,
and “His face just ‘popped’ out at me” were more accurate than those who stated “I
first eliminated the ones definitely not him, then chose among the rest” and “He was
the closest person to what I remember, but not exact”. This indicates that there are
indeed differences between decision processes that are occurring and perhaps the self
reports given by an eyewitness may be a helpful indicator of eyewitness
identification. The results of Dunning and Stern’s research need to be viewed
cautiously, because they are based on self-report measures and can be influenced by
factors that are unrelated to memory (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009)
The current measures used to postdict eyewitness accuracy have their
limitations. Confidence statements are easily malleable; that is, outside influences can
alter a witness’ confidence statement. Variables such as postidentification feedback
(feedback provided directly to an eyewitness after an identification task) and
administrator bias (the lineup administrators’ own expectations) can influence the way
7

in which confidence statements are reported. Decision time is often difficult to
correctly measure in terms of the amount of time that denotes an accurate from an
inaccurate eyewitness. Self-reported decision making strategy has been shown to be a
good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, but these reports can be influenced by factors
unrelated to the actual memory of the event, making them an unreliable source in
determining eyewitness identification accuracy (Wells & Quinlivan, 2009). It is
important then to seek other measurements to postdict eyewitness identification
accuracy.
Identification Task Accuracy: Showups vs. Lineups
Most of the research on identifications has focused on lineups rather than
showups. This is problematic as showup identifications are the most frequently used
form of identifications in the real world. In fact, Flowe, Ebbesen, Burke, and
Chivabunditt (2001) found that showups accounted for 55% of the identification tasks
in a large metropolitan area from 1991 to 1995. Other estimates have been found to
range from 30% (McQuinston & Malpass, 2001) to 77% (Ellsworth, Gonzalez, &
Pembroke, 1993) from different police stations across the country. It is apparent that
showup identification tasks are prevalent and must be examined in comparison to
lineup identifications.
One reason for the lack of research on showups is that showups are thought to
be more suggestive than lineups (Wagenaar & Veefkind, 1992; Yarmey, Yarmey, &
Yarmey, 1996). A recent meta-analysis conducted by Steblay, Fulero, and Lindsay
(2003) analyzed eight articles comparing showup and lineup identifications. The
reported witnesses were more likely to make a correct choice (a combination of both
hits and correct rejections) in the showup condition (69%) as compared to the lineup
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condition (51%). Moreover, there were fewer incorrect identifications in the target
absent showup condition, compared to lineups (15% and 43%, respectively). It was
also found that witnesses were less likely to choose from a showup (27%) compared
to a lineup (54%). Steblay et al. argued that although lineups lead to a higher choosing
rate and fewer correct identifications, they were still a better form of identification
task than a showup. This is because lineups, by definition, contain fillers. Fillers are
known innocent members who are meant to fill out a lineup around a suspect. If an
eyewitness happens to choose a filler from a lineup identification, there is no harm in
doing so because authorities know that the filler is not guilty. Showups do not afford
suspects this safeguard.
A distinction has been made clear by Steblay et al. in regards to the accuracy
of lineups compared to showups. When analyzing lineup identification accuracy, the
presence of fillers puts them at a disadvantage in terms of accuracy. Filler
identifications are generally coded as false identifications thereby leading to increased
numbers of incorrect responses that subsequently puts the lineup procedure at a
disadvantage compared to showups. A further analysis of only the articles that
included the presence of innocent suspects by Steblay et al. found that the false
identification rates for showups did not change (15%), but actually decreased in the
lineup condition (10%). It appears that while showups produce a higher rate of correct
choices, they also produce more false identifications out of the two identification
tasks.
A more recent meta-analysis accounted for a different measurement of
eyewitness identification accuracy other than hits, filler identifications and false
identifications. Clark and Godfrey (2009) also noted this discrepancy of filler
identifications distorting accuracy ratings between lineups and showups. To combat
9

this issue, Clark and Godfrey offered a new measure that does not incorporate filler
identifications. This new measure is termed the innocence risk of an identification.
Innocence risk is the probability that the suspect is innocent, given that he was
identified. This is measured as innocent suspect identifications from target present
lineups divided by innocent suspect identifications from target present lineups plus
guilty suspect identifications from target present lineups
IR = False IDs/[False ID’s + Correct ID’s]
When analyzing showup and lineup identifications from nine studies, Clark
and Godfrey found that overall while showups and lineups produced similar false
identification rates (.18 and .11, respectively) showups place innocent suspects at
greater risk (.31) compared to lineups (.21). This is problematic, and led the authors to
conclude that showups do indeed put an innocent suspect at a statistically greater risk
of being falsely identified.
From both the Steblay et. al (2003) and the Clark and Godfrey (2009) metaanalyses, a common theme is obtained. Overall, showups produce more correct
identifications, but consequently produce more false identifications in the process.
The fact that showups do not offer the protection of filler identifications is of great
concern, as can be seen by the higher innocence risk obtained by Clark and Godfrey.
For these reasons it is argued that showups are a more dangerous form of eyewitness
identification task and should not be utilized unless all other options are exhausted.
Judgments of Learning and Meta-Memory
Judgments of learning (JOLs) could potentially be useful as a measure of
postdicting eyewitness identification accuracy. Nelson and Narens (1990) offer a

10

comprehensive theoretical framework of metamemory and how JOLs fit within this
framework. According to Nelson and Narens, the monitoring and control of human
memory first begins during an acquisition stage. This stage consists of two goals;
first, when individuals become aware of the to-be-remembered items, a judgment is
made about the level of mastery that must be attained during acquisition. This is
termed the norm of study. After this norm has been established, the person then makes
a decision about how to go about attaining that level of mastery (i.e., formulates a
plan). The authors note that a distinction should be made between retrospective
monitoring and prospective monitoring that occurs during the formulating of a plan.
Retrospective monitoring is a confidence judgment about a previous recall response,
while prospective monitoring is a judgment about subsequent responding. This is
important because JOLs fall in the prospective monitoring category.
Prospective monitoring is next subdivided into three separate categories in
terms of the state of to-be-remembered items. The first is an ease of learning (EOL)
judgment, defined as a prediction about what items will be easiest/most difficult to
learn or the strategy that will make learning the easiest. The second is a JOL.
According to Nelson and Narens (1990), these occur during or after acquisition and
are predictions about future performance on currently recallable items. Lastly, a
feeling of knowing (FOK) judgment occurs during or after acquisition and is a
judgment about whether an item that is currently un-recallable will be remembered on
a subsequent test of memory. All three of these items can occur at different times
during the monitoring and control of human memory, but are categorized under
acquisition of memory. After acquisition, retention of information occurs in which the
maintenance of previously acquired knowledge takes place. After retention, the
retrieval stage occurs. According to Nelson and Narens this not only occurs in
11

searching for a recallable item itself, but setting up the particular cues to initiate the
search for information. This overall model provides a framework for how memory
works and also the place of JOLs within that framework.
JOLs are conventionally measured using an immediate or delayed format.
According to Koriat (1997), in a typical experiment involving JOLs, participants are
instructed to memorize a list of paired associate words (e.g., tree-wind) for
preparation to recall a target word (e.g., wind) when a cue word is offered (e.g., tree).
Following a study phase, individuals are presented with a cue and are asked to make a
prediction about the likelihood of recalling a target word. This is the JOL. When JOLs
are collected immediately, the JOL is assessed after each paired associate and before
presentation of the next paired associate. Following the study phase participants are
given a cued recall test. The JOL rating is then compared to the actual accuracy of
participants’ responses at an item level. It has been found that in these situations,
these immediate JOLs have been relatively poor indicators of accuracy (Dunlosky &
Nelson, 1994).
The reason that these immediate JOLs were not indicative of accuracy was
initially not clear. Nelson and Dunlosky (1991) offered a potential explanation for the
lack of a relationship between immediate JOLs and recall accuracy. They argued that
the immediate JOLs are only moderately related to recall accuracy because the
information immediately accessible in short term memory (STM) adds a significant
amount of “noise”, or interference, to the JOL measurement. As a result, the
immediate JOL condition is measuring only those items in STM. Furthermore the
information available at test is from long term memory (LTM). Thus the JOLS are
made from information available in STM but information in LTM is used at the time
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of testing. The lack of a relationship may be accounted for by the fact that participants
are using different information during the different phases of the procedure.
If this truly was the case, then by delaying a JOL and allowing participants to
transfer the information into LTM before asking them the likelihood they would
remember that item should increase the accuracy of the JOLs. This is exactly what
Nelson and Dunlosky (1990) found, that JOL accuracy was statistically greater for
delayed JOL items than immediate JOL items. This finding has also been replicated in
a much more recent meta-analysis conducted by Rhodes and Tauber (2011), who
found in their meta-analysis that delaying JOLs served to substantially increase the
accuracy of JOLs in comparison to an immediate JOL condition.
A note must be made about the way JOLs are typically measured. According
to Nelson (1984), Goodman-Kruskall gamma correlations are the recommended
statistical measurement in meta-memory. Gamma correlations are a non-parametric
index of association that ranges between -1.0 to +1.0, which statistically quantifies the
association between JOLs and memory performance and are performed on an itemlevel (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). This measurement does have limitations even though
is it the preferred method of analysis. In a typical meta-memory format hundreds of
word pair associates are gathered, and subsequently hundreds of JOL measurements
are collected. When there are very few items to collect from participants, the gamma
correlation can become very unstable (Perfect & Hollins, 1993). This can prove
problematic in conducting the gamma correlation analysis.
JOLs and Psychology and Law
In the case of eyewitness identifications, police officers often ask eyewitnesses
if they think they can identify the perpetrator before the lineup procedure begins. This
13

is already in essence a JOL without the numeric estimate. Thus the standard police
practice could be adapted quite easily to the JOL format by simply asking the witness
to give a numeric estimate of their eyewitness judgments. According to the metamemory framework offered by Nelson and Narens (1990), items that are transferred
into LTM before the collection of JOLs are more likely to be remembered and the
correlation between the JOL and accuracy will be higher. In the case of the
eyewitness, the face of the perpetrator may or may not be available in LTM. If the
face of the perpetrator has truly been transferred into LTM, the JOL should be higher,
and may give a potential way to substantiate the accuracy of an eyewitness’s
identification. Conversely, if the face of the perpetrator is not remembered, the JOL
will be lower, and could be indicative of eyewitness inaccuracy. In both conditions,
the eyewitness is still highly accurate in monitoring their memory. Only when a JOL
and the subsequent accuracy are not aligned (i.e. High JOL, incorrect recall
performance) is a JOL not indicative of accuracy. This concept may provide a new
way to postdict eyewitness accuracy.
JOLs may be better predictors of eyewitness accuracy compared to traditional
measures, such as confidence, because JOLs are highly correlated with people’s
ability to recall items after a brief delay (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). Also, in the metamemory field, JOLs offer the ability to distinguish between what one does and does
not know. If it can be empirically shown that higher JOLs correlate with higher levels
of accuracy in eyewitness identification situations, it can be said that those
eyewitnesses who exhibit high JOLs may be more accurate than those with lower
JOLs. This can be extremely helpful to authority figures by giving indication of which
eyewitnesses may be reliable (or rather, have a reliable memory of the perpetrator), as
well as those eyewitnesses who are unreliable. JOLs may also offer a helpful indicator
14

of the reliability of an eyewitness to jurors much in the same way that confidence
measures are used to educate juries.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of JOLs in an eyewitness situation a
modified eyewitness paradigm was developed based loosely on the procedure used by
Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, and MacLin (2005). This paradigm was tested by
allowing participants to view a series of faces, to complete a distracter task, and then
perform an identification from a series of lineups or showups. In order to account for
the JOL phase, after viewing the series of photographs that were matched with a
contextual background, participants received the same contextual background alone.
While viewing the contextual background alone, participants were asked to give a
JOL about the likelihood of remembering the face that was paired with the context.
As mentioned previously, delaying a JOL significantly increases the accuracy of these
tasks (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011).
It is for this reason that the main focus of this paper will be the whether these
delayed JOLs can prove to be a significant indicator of eyewitness identification
accuracy. If previous research has shown that immediate JOL conditions only produce
small and non-significant results, using delayed JOLs would be in ones best interest
by maximizing the probability of obtaining significant results. This may be especially
true in the case of a novel learning format. It also must be taken into consideration
that in real world eyewitness identification settings, it is virtually impossible to
perform an identification task immediately after viewing a crime. Even showups, a
situation in which an officer shows a suspect to an eyewitness fairly quickly, would
still not properly simulate an immediate recall task. The novel face-context paired
associate task is not typical of the meta-memory literature. It was hoped that the
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effects of delaying a JOL on accuracy would be reflected in the eyewitness
identification format to the same degree as those findings in the meta-memory field.

Hypotheses
Identification Accuracy Hypothesis 1 stated that showups would perform
worse than lineups in terms of identification accuracy. As mentioned previously, the
risk showups pose to suspects, their accuracy issues, and their lack of safeguards
make showups an un-preferred method of obtaining identifications (Clark & Godfrey,
2009; Gronlund et al, 2012). While showups produce more correct identifications,
they in turn produce more false identifications of an innocent suspect. Probative
values, or probability the suspect was guilty given that he/she was identified, were
calculated to determine the identification task that presents the safest situation for
suspects. Target present and target absent conditions were employed to mimic real life
eyewitness identification conditions, because the location of the perpetrator is not
always known to authority figures.
JOLs and Meta-Memory Hypothesis 2 was that JOL-accuracy correlations
would significantly predict accuracy better than confidence-accuracy correlations. In
the meta-memory field, JOLs have been found to significantly predict high levels of
accuracy for to-be-remembered items. More specifically, this correlation has been
found with delayed JOLs (Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). It has been shown that
confidence ratings, while moderately correlated to accuracy under ideal conditions, do
not greatly correlate with eyewitness identification accuracy (Sporer et al., 1995).
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CHAPTER II

METHOD

Participants
Data were collected from a sample of 147 undergraduate psychology students
from The University of Alabama in Huntsville. Of those, the data from 2 participants
were excluded because they failed to correctly complete the manipulation check. This
resulted in a final sample of 145 participants with an average age of 21.53 (SD =
4.80). Due to researcher error, demographic information was collected from only 48
participants. Participants were invited to sign up for the experiment during their
introductory psychology courses in exchange for class credit. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. APA ethical guidelines
were followed for each participant (see Appendix A for IRB approval).
Design
A 2 (Target Presence: Present, Absent) x 2 (Identification Task: Lineup,
Showup) mixed design was utilized, with Target Presence as a within subjects factor,
and Identification Task as a between subjects factor. The dependent variables
included JOLs, identification accuracy, identification type, and confidence in
identification decision. Identification type was measured as the percentage of correct
identifications, misses, foil identifications, correct rejections, and false identifications.
Identification accuracy was measured in two ways. A correct identification was a
correct choice from target present identification task, and an incorrect identification
was the total number of false identifications in a target absent identification task. .
Further, relative accuracy was measured using Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations
17

for both JOL and confidence statements in comparison with accuracy within subjects.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to measure the relationship between
confidence and accuracy, and was conducted between subjects.
Materials.
Targets Guilty targets were chosen out of databases maintained by The Iowa
State University (http://www.iastate.edu/) and The University of Texas El Paso
(http://www.utep.edu). The target photos consisted of a front head shot from the top
of the shoulders up, with targets wearing everyday clothing. There were a total of 5
male photos (3 Caucasian and 2 African American) along with 3 female (Caucasian)
targets for a total of 8 target faces. These faces were chosen by the researcher with the
restriction that they did not have any distinguishing characteristics or features (i.e.,
tattoos, piercings, glasses, and so forth). In order to obtain descriptions of the target
faces, 60 pilot participants viewed a slide show consisting of the 8 target faces and
were prompted to “write a description of the faces you are about to see”. The
participants were allowed approximately 1 min to write a description of each face.
The modal description for each of the faces was compiled by counting the most
frequently occurring characteristic of each face. This provided the experimenter with
a general description of each of the 8 faces (e.g., black male, no facial hair, short afro
like hair, dark eyes).
Filler Selection Once all the modal descriptions were attained, the guilty
targets were placed in a 6 person lineup. Five fillers were chosen for each target face.
The experimenter chose 5 faces that matched the modal descriptions for each face
from the aforementioned databases. The 8 lineups were tested for functional size (i.e.
the number of members of the lineup who are viable options given the description of
the target). Tredoux’s E is a measure of lineup functional size. To obtain a
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measurement of Tredoux’s E participants were given a description of the perpetrator
and were then asked to choose the person from the lineup that best fit the description.
This was performerd for all 8 lineups using the modal descriptions. Brigham, Ready,
and Spier (1990) argue that lineups should contain a minimum number of three viable
members in a six person lineup, while Malpass (1981) argued for a more conservative
criterion of five acceptable members. In the present study, the average of these two
values was used, with four viable alternatives as the acceptable functional size.
Because of issues in creation of lineups and difficulty obtaining such a large array of
photo lineups with an acceptable functional size of four or greater, some lineups are
below this value (see Table 2.1)
Critical Foils The critical foils were obtained from the same lineups as the
guilty target. The filler that was chosen most frequently was deemed the critical foil.
Subsequent lineups were produce for the critical foils in the same manner as for the
targets.
Lineups There were 16 identification tasks in total (8 Guilty Targets and 8
Critical Foils). Guilty target lineups included 5 fillers and the guilty target. Critical
foil lineups were exactly the same as guilty target lineups with the exception that the
guilty target was replaced by the critical foil and an extra filler took place of the
critical foil position. See Figures 2.1 and 2.2 for guilty target and critical foil lineups,
respectively. The position of the target (guilty target or critical foils) was randomly
determined. The critical foil lineups were tested for functional size in the same way
the guilty suspect lineups were. Tredoux’s E was calculated in the same manner for
the critical foil lineups as the guilty target lineups as well (refer to Table 2.1 for
Tredoux’s E measurements).
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Table 2.1
Tredoux’s E Measurements for Target and Critical Foil Lineups_____________
_____

Target Lineup

Critical Foil Lineup__ _____

Lineup 1

5.30

4.80

Lineup 2

5.56

5.05

Lineup 3

4.41

3.86

Lineup 4

4.12

4.57

Lineup 5

4.56

3.27

Lineup 6

4.30

4.52

Lineup 7

4.54

4.20

Lineup 8

4.86

3.02
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Figure 2.1 – Guilty Target Lineup (Note: Guilty Target in Position 5)

Figure 2.2 – Critical Foil Lineup (Note: Critical Foil in Position 3)
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Context Backgrounds Contextual backgrounds were used in order to make
the context distinctive for each face and to simulate a paired associate task. The
contexts served as the retrieval cues for the faces. The context backgrounds were
stock images found on the internet (see Figure 2.3). Each target and critical foil pair
were matched with the same contextual background. All contextual backgrounds were
paired randomly so that no guilty target-critical foil pair received the same contextual
background as any other guilty target-critical foil pair. No contextual background was
ever paired with more than one guilty target – critical foil pair. The target and critical
foil faces were then photoshopped onto their backgrounds (see Figure 2.4 for an
example).
All contextual backgrounds were normed to ensure that they could be
correctly identified. To this end, 30 undergraduate participants were asked to identify
21 backgrounds. The contextual backgrounds were displayed for as long as necessary
on a computer. After participants viewed the backgrounds, they were asked to give a
one to two word description of the background. Each description was reviewed to
determine if the description matched the background. The total percent of correct
descriptions was determined for each background. The 10 backgrounds with the
highest percentage correct were used. These ten backgrounds ranged from 90% to
100% correct descriptions.
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Figure 2.3 – Contextual Background

Figure 2.4 – Target Face Photoshopped Onto Contextual Background
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Manipulation Check A contextual background was shown to participants that
had not been paired with a facial stimulus. Participants were asked if the contextual
background had been used in any of the previous comparisons. This was meant to
assess the memory of the details of the face-context paired associates. This
manipulation check can be found in Appendix B
Procedure
The experiment was conducted online using the website
www.surveymonkey.com. Participants completed the experiment on an individual
basis. Participants began by giving their informed consent via the computer. They
were then informed that they would be viewing a series of faces, and that they should
study the faces for a subsequent test of memory. Eight faces, (3 Caucasian and 2
African American males and 3 Caucasian females) were shown sequentially with all
faces being shown on a contextual background (e.g., Mountain Range). After viewing
all 8 face-context pairs, a delayed JOL was collected in which participants viewed
only a background, and were asked if they could remember the face (via yes or no
option). Participants were then asked how likely they were to remember the face that
matched that specific background (0 being not at all likely, 100 being extremely
likely). The orders in which only backgrounds were shown were randomized so that
the order did not match the face-context paired (i.e., encoding) stage.
Following the JOL phase, participants completed a distracter task consisting of
7 numerical series tests (e.g., 4, 8, 16, 32, ?), and took approximately 5 min to
complete this task. Participants were then informed that their goal was to identify the
faces that they had previously viewed paired with the contextual backgrounds.
Participants then viewed a contextual background, followed by an identification task
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of either a lineup or a show up. The order in which the contextual backgrounds were
presented matched the order in which they were presented in the initial face-context
paired encoding stage. The identification task contained either the target (which was
shown previously) or a critical foil (which was not previously shown).
The only difference between the lineup and show up was that in the showup
condition participants viewed a single photo of the target (or critical foil, depending
on the condition) and in the lineup condition participants viewed a typical six person
lineup. Before seeing either the lineup or the showup, participants were instructed that
the face that was paired with the context may or may not be present. In the lineup
condition, participants were given the option of choosing “not there” if they felt the
face did not match the contextual background. Following these instructions,
participants proceeded to the identification task. Following the identification task,
participants were asked to indicate how confident they were that they selected the
correct person on a 1 to 7 scale (not at all confident, to extremely confident). When
the participants completed the identification tasks, they were debriefed and thanked
for their assistance.
Statistics. Data were recorded using Microsoft Excel and were transferred
directly into SPSS, where all analyses were conducted. A chi-square analysis was
used to check that any face was not being chosen more or less frequently than others.
Pearson correlation analyses were used to calculate correlation coefficients between
confidence and accuracy ratings. Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlations were
calculated to assess the relative accuracy of the JOLs and confidence statements with
accuracy. Logistic Regression analyses were utilized to examine main effects and
interactions of the independent variables on categorical data. Chi-square analyses
were further utilized to determine the effect of target presence and identification task
25

on accuracy rates. A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on the gamma correlations collected to determine which measurement type
was a better predictor of accuracy. Simple linear regressions were computed in an
attempt to alleviate some of the issues with the computed gamma correlation statistic.
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CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks
Memory for Contextual Background. As a manipulation check participants
were presented with one novel contextual background, and if they reported that it was
seen in the study they were excluded from the analyses. Overall, 98% of the
participants correctly rejected the contextual background (see Appendix B for an
example of the manipulation check). The remaining 2% of participants were
excluded from all subsequent analyses.
Identification Accuracy The frequency of correct identifications, misses,
correct rejections, foil identifications and false identifications by identification task
and target presence are listed in Table 3.1. Responses were considered correct if
participants gave a correct identification in a target present identification task and a
correct rejection in a target absent condition. A 2 (Target Presence: Present, Absent) x
2 (Identification Task: Lineup, Showup) logistic regression was conducted on
participant’s identification accuracy. The analysis revealed a significant effect of both
Identification task, Wald (1) = 14.17, p < .01, and Target presence Wald (1) = 71.88,
p < .01 The effect of identification task was such that when viewing a showup
identification task, participants were 1.53 times more likely to make correct decisions
(86 %) than when viewing a lineup (77%). Furthermore, participants were 3.79 times
more likely to make a correct decision when the target was present in the
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identification task than when they were not present. The main effects were qualified
by an Identification Task by Target Presence interaction, Wald (1) =19.28, p < .01.
In order to further investigate the interaction I examined identification task in
target present and target absent within each identification task condition separately.
When a target was present in the stimuli, there was no significant difference in correct
identifications between the lineup or showup identification task, χ² (1, N = 76) = .05,
p = .83. In the target absent condition, however, there was a significant difference as
showups produced significantly more false identifications than lineups, χ² (1, N = 76)
= 18.72, p < .01, v = .18. When viewing a target absent identification tasks, showups
were 3.14 times more likely to produce a false identification than when viewing a
lineup identification. Thus the interaction can be explained by an increase in false
identification in showups, even though there was no significant difference in the
frequency of correct identifications between showup and lineups.

Table 3.1
Identification Type by Identification Task and Target Presence
Hit

Miss

Show up

45.5 %

4.5 %

TP

90.9 %

TA

Correct Rejection

Foil ID

False ID

40 %

----

9.4 %

9.1 %

----

----

----

----

----

81.2 %

----

18.8 %

Lineup

45.7 %

1.8 %

32.0 %

17.1 %

3.5 %

TP

91.4 %

3.6 %

----

4.9 %

----

TA

----

----

63.8 %

29.3 %

6.9 %

Note. TA = Target Absent; TP = Target Present; ID = Identification
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Probative Values Probative values measure the probability the suspect was
guilty given that he/she was identified. Clark and Godfrey (2009) have argued that
correct identifications in target present and correct rejections in target absent lineups
places lineups at a disadvantage because witnesses can choose a filler in a lineup but
not a show up. This in turn reduces correct rejections in target absent lineups. Every
filler choice now reduces the correct rejection rate of the lineup. Probative value
measures are a more sensitive measure of identification performance because they are
unaffected by the filler response rate. Probative value is typically measured by taking
the number of correct identifications from an identification task, and dividing it by the
correct identifications plus the false identifications from that same task (PV = Correct
ID’s / [Correct ID’s + False ID’s]).
The overall probative value for each identification task is displayed in Table
3.2. Those in the lineup identification task had significantly higher probative value
measures (M = .94, SEM = .013) than participants in the showup identification
(M = .86, SEM = .021), t (143) = -3.33, p < .01, d = -0.55. This replicates Clark and
Godfrey (2009) and Gronlund et al (2012) who also found that lineups had higher
probative value than showups. These data confirm that lineup identifications are the
superior identification task.

Table 3.2
Probative Value Measures by Identification Task
Correct ID

False ID

C/(C + F)

SEM

Showup

.455

.094

.861

.021

Lineup

.457

.035

.941

.013

Note. ID = Identification; C = Correct Identification Rate; F = False Identification
Rate
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Correlations with Accuracy. Pearson correlations were calculated to
determine the relationship between confidence and accuracy ratings. Overall, higher
levels of eyewitness confidence were related to higher levels of identification
accuracy, r (1160) = .45, p < .01. The data were then split into two separate
categories, choosers and non-choosers. Previous research by Sporer et al. (2005) has
found evidence that participants who make a choice from an identification task (i.e.,
choosers) generally have higher confidence-accuracy correlations than those who do
not make a choice (non-choosers) Choosers had a significant confidence accuracy
correlation, r (706) = .59, p < .01, as did non-choosers, r (454) = .17, p < .01.
In order to determine if these values are significantly different from one
another, a Fishers r-to-Z transformation was computed between the r values obtained
from choosers and non-choosers. It was found that there was a significant difference
between these values, Z = 2.90, p < .01. Both categories show that higher levels of
confidence correlate significantly to higher levels of accuracy, but that those in the
chooser category had a higher confidence-accuracy correlation than did those in the
non-chooser category. This pattern is consistent with Sporer et al.’s findings (2005).
A comparison of identification type shows that both showups and lineups produce a
significant confidence-accuracy correlation, r (69) = .31, p < .01; and r (76) = .51, p <
.01, respectively.
JOLs vs. Confidence Gamma correlations were calculated between JOLs and
performance accuracy for both showup and lineup identifications. As mentioned
previously, gamma correlations are the typical non-parametric index of association
that ranges between -1.0 to +1.0, which statistically quantifies the association between
JOLs and memory performance (or in this case, identification accuracy). Because of
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some limitations of the gamma calculation discussed previously, 57 participants were
removed from the analysis, leaving a total of 88 quantifiable values.
A 2 (Identification task: Showup vs. Lineup) x 2 (Measurement type: Confidence vs.
JOL) repeated measures ANOVA was calculated with measurement type as the within
subjects factor and identification task as the between subjects factor. The analysis
yielded a main effect for Measurement type, F (1, 86) = 56.62, p < .01, η² = .40, no
main effect for Identification task, F (1, 86) = .14, p = .71, and no interaction,
F (1, 86) = 2.10, p = .15.
Using gamma correlations, it is clear that participants’ confidence ratings
provided a better indicator of their accuracy than their JOLs, with confidence
statements obtaining a mean gamma of G = .752, SEM = .075. In comparison, JOLs
only obtained a mean gamma score of G = -.003, SEM = .074.There was not a
significant difference in mean gamma scores between showups and lineups, with each
obtaining a mean gamma of G = .353, SE = .085, and G = .395, SE = .071,
respectively.
The previous analysis may give a biased picture of the correlation between
JOLs and accuracy because of the small stimulus set (N = 88). In the typical JOL
experiment there are hundreds of word-paired associates presented to the participants.
In order to compute a gamma correlation on a participant level, there must be some
level of variance within participant’s accuracy responses. Because of limited number
of paired associates, some participants (N = 56) were 100% accurate in their
responses. This created a situation in which a gamma correlation could not be
computed for specific participants.
Because of these issues, simple linear regression analyses were performed
with participant’s accuracy being the criterion variable, and their confidence and JOL
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responses as predictor variables. JOLs were a significant predictor of accuracy, β =
.132, t (1159) = 4.54, p < .01, and accounted for 1.7% (R² = .017) of the variance in
accuracy scores. A similar analysis with confidence as predictor was found to be a
significant predictor of accuracy, β = .449, t (1159) = 17.12, p < .01, and accounted
for 20.2% (R² = .202) of the variance in accuracy scores. Although the gamma
correlations revealed no relationship between JOLs and accuracy, the linear
regression indicated that JOLs do indeed significantly predict accuracy.
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

The goals of this experiment were two-fold. First, of particular interest was
whether lineup identifications were more reliable than showup identifications.
Second, I examined a potential new measure of predicting eyewitness’s identification
accuracy: JOLs. The results provide support for the first research question, but
provided mixed results concerning JOLs as a valid indicator of eyewitness accuracy.
Previous research comparing showups and lineups has found that showups
produce fewer correct identifications and more false identifications of an innocent
suspect than lineups (Clark & Godfrey, 2009; Gronlund et al., 2012). Consistent with
prior research, showups led to slightly fewer correct identifications, and significantly
more false identifications in the current study. Thus, lineups yielded more accurate
eyewitness identifications than showups.
One of the most commonly studied indices of accuracy is eyewitness’s
confidence (Charmin & Cahill, 2011). Previous research has shown that confidence
and accuracy are only weakly correlated (Sporer et al. 1995; Wells & Murray, 1984).
However, willingness to choose moderates the strength of this relationship. That is,
those eyewitnesses who make an identification (choosers) have a stronger relationship
between confidence and accuracy than those who do not choose (non-choosers)
(Brigham, 1988). This relationship was replicated in the present study. More
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specifically, participants who made an identification (choosers) had a stronger
confidence-accuracy correlation than those who did not make an identification.
The present research attempted to investigate a potentially more reliable
indicator of eyewitness identification accuracy than confidence: JOLs. JOLs have
been found to predict recall accuracy to a fairly high degree during meta-memory
tests when participants are asked to provide JOLs for a large number of paired
associates (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). In the present study, JOLs were gathered after
participants viewed a face-context paired associate, and before an identification was
made. Confidence judgments were also collected after participants made an
identification to assess how both types of judgments would correlate to identification
accuracy. Both types of judgments predicted identification accuracy in the regression
analyses although confidence statements accounted for more variance than JOLs. This
finding replicates similar research by Perfect and Hollins (1996), who also found that
retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) were more indicative of accuracy than
participant’s feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments, which are another type of metamemory judgment similar to JOLs.
One issue with the predictive strength of JOLs is the way in which the
correlation is measured. The measurement that is typically used is Gamma (Nelson,
1984). When there is little to no variance in the distribution (such that a participant
was 100% accurate/inaccurate) no statistic can be calculated. These responses are
removed from the subsequent analysis. Thus the analysis ignores those participants
who were the most (or least) accurate. This has the effect of reducing the total sample
size. Reducing the sample size not only reduces the power of the analysis, but it does
not account for the participants that were 100% accurate (or inaccurate) in their
performance. In the current research 39% of the participants had to be removed from
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the analysis for perfect responding. Thus the gamma correlation may not be
representative of the memory performance of participants.
In addition to the lack of variance, there are also theoretical reasons that may
account for the current finding that confidence judgments were better indicators of
accuracy than JOLs. JOLS are predictions about future memory performance. In
comparison, the confidence assessments gathered can be considered RCJs. Thus
confidence and JOLs are really measuring two different things. In fact, Dougherty,
Scheck, Nelson and Narons (2005) have found evidence that supports the idea that
JOLs and RCJs are different. The authors argue that differences in JOLs and RCJs
may be based on different intrinsic and extrinsic cues of the stimuli. Intrinsic cues are
the inherent properties of the to-be remembered items (such as the vividness, clarity,
or frequency of the stimuli). Extrinsic cues are the characteristics of the learner or the
learning such as the conditions under which learning takes place and the encoding
operations used during study. The differences in performance may be based on the
impact of these intrinsic and extrinsic cues of the facial stimuli on participants JOLs
and RCJs.
If RCJs and JOLs are utilizing different memory cues, then it stands to
reason that a different relationship between identification accuracy and the type of
judgment used would occur. Consistent with this idea, Costermans, Lories, and Ansay
(1992) found FOK judgments also have a different psychological basis when
compared to RCJs, such that FOKs are based on beliefs of what will be remembered.
RCJs on the other hand are based on what memory was actually retrieved. JOLs may
be similar to feelings-of-knowing in that they are beliefs about what will be
remembered, not what is actually remembered. This could explain why RCJs were
better at indicating accuracy than JOLs.
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From the standpoint of eyewitness memory literature, there may be another
explanation for these differences. Perfect et al. (1993) compared confidence-accuracy
ratings between eyewitness memory and general knowledge tests (e.g., the rules of
football). They found that the confidence judgments were less predictive in the
eyewitness memory tests compared to general knowledge tests. The study was further
expanded on by Perfect and Hollins (1996) by including FOK judgments as well as
the confidence-accuracy relationships. The authors found that overall, meta-memory
measures were worse at predicting accuracy than confidence. In addition, metamemory measures were worse in the eyewitness memory task compared to the general
knowledge task. The results suggest that meta-memory judgments may not be
appropriate for complex events such as eyewitness memory.
There were several limitations to the present study. First, the small number of
stimuli may account for the ceiling effects. As mentioned earlier, 39% of the
participants had perfect or near perfect responding. This may be due to the fact that
there were only 8 face-context pairs to remember. In the typical JOL study
participants have to remember dozens, if not hundreds of paired-associates. Adding
more paired associates might remedy the current issues as well as offer new insight
into JOLs as potential indices of accuracy in an eyewitness memory format. Second,
the contextual stimuli used may have been too strong of a cue. As mentioned
previously, the backgrounds had a correct identification rate of 90% or greater. These
backgrounds may have been too helpful in aiding participants in remembering the
paired facial stimuli, which may have added to the ceiling effects. The limited number
of face-context pairs and the strength of the contextual cues may have combined to
create a situation that made the memory task too easy for participants.
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Future directions for the current research may be in mugshot identification
situations, in which eyewitnesses view multiple photographs (sometimes up to 150
photographs) and decide if one photograph is that of the perpetrator (Graham,
Shepherd, & Haydn, 1979). This may circumvent the current issues with the limited
number of stimuli. Also, one may use JOLs in a more realistic eyewitness
identification setting by using staged crime videos instead of static photos. This could
better replicate the complex events presented in eyewitness identification situations,
thus giving an improved understanding of how JOLs work in a real world eyewitness
identifications.
In conclusion, the current study reaffirms existing research regarding the
reliability of lineup identifications over showups. Lineups consistently produced
similar rates of correct identifications, while lowering the probability of false
identifications of an innocent suspect. Further, in an attempt to discover a new way to
minimize false confessions, the use of JOLs was offered as a potential new measure
of indicating eyewitness accuracy. This novel index produced mixed results. There
was little evidence to support JOLs as a significant indicator of accuracy in a withinparticipants analysis, but a between-participants analysis produced differing results. In
either case, confidence judgments were more indicative of accuracy than JOLs. This
is not to say that meta-memory judgments are completely ineffective as accuracy
indices, but more research must be conducted before a definitive answer can be given.
.
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